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The economy of the arts is exceptional, or rather, it is relatively exceptional.
One important characteristic that makes the economy of the arts differ
from economies in other sectors is what Throsby (1994) has called ‘the
work-preference of artists’. When creative artists like composers, writers
and visual artists, but also many performing artists like dancers and actors,
receive more income, they do not use it to work fewer hours in the arts in
order to have more leisure time, but instead they use it to work more hours.1
Evidently, the advantages of working more hours in the arts offset the
advantages of more leisure time. This relative anomaly has far-reaching
consequences for the economy of the arts. It implies that the low average
incomes in the arts are largely structural and that subsidies intended to raise
income tend to be futile and can easily be counter-productive. At the same
time it raises questions about the interpretation of low incomes and the
professional status of artists: are artists as badly off as they appear to be?
Or should a majority of artists be regarded as happy consumers instead of
as miserable producers?
Artists may behave differently, but they are no saints 
The work preference of artists suggests that artists have saint-like qualities.
In making ‘sacred’ art, they forget about themselves and only care about
art. If the only way to make art is to accept a lousy second job in order to
make a living and to have just enough money to buy paint or rent a studio,
they do not hesitate to wait in restaurants, work as night porters or clean
houses. As soon as a bit more money comes in, however, whether from
waiting, from subsidies, from a partner or from art, they cut down on their
second jobs in order to spend more hours making art. Therefore income is
a constraint and not a means to obtain consumer goods, including more
leisure time. In this sense an imaginary survival constraint exists (Throsby,
1994; Rengers and Madden, 2000).
This view does not necessarily imply that artists are selfless, because, by
making art, artists can still seek private satisfaction. Nevertheless, it tends
to reinforce the mythology of sacred art and of passionate and selfless
artists, who are indifferent to external rewards. Closer acquaintance pro-
vides a less exceptional view of the artist: making art is not a mystic self-
rewarding activity but, as in other professions, it is a means of obtaining
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rewards, not only in the form of money and private satisfaction, but also in
the form of recognition, status and other non-monetary rewards that come
from other people. The same applies to any other worker. The difference
between the average artist and other professionals is therefore a matter of
degree. It appears that artists have a stronger inclination to seek non-
monetary rewards, such as recognition by peers and private satisfaction,
than average professionals have. They sooner ‘forsake money’ or, more pre-
cisely, they have a stronger inclination to exchange money income for non-
monetary income.
A strong inclination to forsake money may still be interpreted as a virtu-
ous quality of artists, a quality that is rare in modern society. Therefore it
is important to note that artists do not choose this quality. From parental
care until art college, the relative importance of recognition by peers and
the unimportance of money have been implanted in artists. This quality has
become part of the habitus of the artist (Abbing, 2002).
Persistent low hourly incomes suggest that artists are oriented towards non-
monetary rewards
On the basis of surveys, Throsby (1994) and Rengers and Madden (2000)
provide evidence that artists differ from average professionals: they would
sooner sacrifice money income in order to be able to work more hours in
their profession.
The strongest evidence of the large extent of an exceptional inclination
to exchange money for non-monetary rewards is indirect. In the first place,
on average artists earn little by working in the arts. Yearly and, more sig-
nificantly, hourly incomes are exceptionally low, given the level of profes-
sional training of artists. Researchers have found an income penalty for
artists, due to their work in the arts instead of in a comparable profession,
of around 30 per cent.2 In specific cases, however, an income penalty of 100
per cent and more has been found. (For instance, 40 per cent of Dutch
visual artists receive insufficient income, including subsidies, to cover their
costs. Therefore their income penalty is more than 100 per cent: see
Meulenbeek et al., 2000.) What is amazing is that new artists continue to
enter the arts. In spite of low money incomes the arts are evidently attrac-
tive. In the second place, artists, more than other professionals, increasingly
supplement their income from art with income from other sources. Among
other sources, money comes from partners, from social benefits and, above
all, from second jobs.3
The fact that average money incomes in the arts are lower than in com-
parable professions, and that artists have second jobs far more often than
other professionals, confirms the hypothesis that average artists have a rel-
atively strong inclination to exchange money for non-monetary rewards
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and therefore have a low standard of living, which is close to a survival con-
straint. Supplementary explanations for low incomes can be given, such as
a greater inclination to seek risks and a belief among artists that they are
unfit for non-arts jobs (Abbing 2002), but they are relatively unimportant.
Misinformation, however, that induces artists to believe that they can reap
ample non-monetary rewards in the arts adds to low incomes.
Poverty in the arts is structural
Owing to a more than average inclination to go for non-monetary rewards,
in combination with the belief that the arts can offer plenty of these
rewards, the arts sector is extremely attractive. The implications of this phe-
nomenon are far-reaching. If the inclination and the belief are strong, this
implies that poverty in the arts is largely structural. More money flowing
into the arts, whether from sales, donations, subsidies or benefits, primar-
ily leads to more artists and does not raise income.4 The mechanism is
broadly the same for different sources of income. Here we discuss subsidies
because governments have used them and still use them to try and raise the
income of artists.
First, it should be noted that the word ‘poverty’ is used here in a formal
sense; it implies that average hourly incomes from working in the arts are
so low that artists cannot make a living as artists (though, given other
sources of income, some artists may not be poor overall). Second, contrary
to popular belief, artists have not always been poor; large-scale poverty in
the arts commenced in the twentieth century and was more significant in
the second half of the century.5 It appears that the mythology of the arts
and the corresponding inclinations of artists changed at the beginning of
the twentieth century (and they may change again). Structural as poverty
may be at present, it is bound to pass sooner or later. Third, improving the
unacceptable economic conditions of artists has been paramount in the
fast-increasing postwar subsidization of the arts in mainland European
countries. Although this motive is nowadays not emphasized as much as
before, in the background it is still important. Given their general social
policies, these welfare states cannot allow one group of professionals to
have, on average, a much lower standard of living than comparable profes-
sionals have (Abbing, 2002).
In order to illustrate the mechanism that more money leads to more
artists I give an example from my own practice as an artist. Ten years ago
I received a substantial grant from the Dutch government for so-called
‘innovative artists’. At that moment my work preference, to use Throsby’s
phrase, immediately started to do its work. I decided to stop ‘wasting time’
by making commissioned portraits, which for me had been an inferior arts-
related job. Therefore, in spite of the relatively large subsidy, my income did
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not rise. Moreover, I left a (small) space in the portrait market, which
directly or indirectly has been taken over by a newcomer. In the end the
subsidy only led to more artists. This is what one can expect in a sector that
is so attractive – attractive not because of money but because of the
promise of private satisfaction, recognition, status and other non-mone-
tary rewards.
Because subsidies lead to more artists per head of population, including
more poor artists, poverty increases owing to subsidization.6 This mecha-
nism only ceases to work when subsidies go to really successful artists who
do not leave gaps that can be filled by more newcomers. Therefore, at least
in the short run, subsidies and purchases by governments (and others) that
directly or indirectly go primarily to successful artists could raise average
income a little. (Nevertheless, median income would remain as low as
before and therefore poverty itself would not be reduced.) It follows that
not all subsidies have the same effect on numbers and incomes. For
instance, a tax reduction for art buyers may have a less strong effect on
numbers than a special social benefit scheme for poor artists.7 However,
given the extreme attraction of the arts, it is questionable whether there is
much difference in the long run. One way or another, more money trickles
down and increases numbers rather than raising average income.
Subsidies increase numbers and poverty
The hypothesis that subsidies lead to more artists could be tested by a rough
comparison of countries that differ in subsidization levels after differences
in donations and consumption have been taken into account. Where subsi-
dies for the arts are relatively generous, the number of artists per hundred
thousand inhabitants should be higher than in a situation where there is less
subsidization. However, no existing data allow such a comparison.8 Here
casual observations, unreliable as they are, can be more meaningful than
inferences from inadequate statistics. For instance, few observers would dis-
agree that there are more fine artists per head of population in the
Netherlands, with its relatively high level of subsidization, than in the USA,
with its lower level of subsidization. The hypothesis could also be tested by
a diachronic comparison within one country. If subsidy levels change
rather abruptly, numbers of artists should also change. Although in this
case, as well, changing definitions of who are artists and inadequate meas-
uring techniques prevent the drawing of straightforward conclusions, indi-
rect evidence allows cautious conclusions.
There have been two major changes in the subsidization of visual artists
in the Netherlands that almost certainly were accompanied by an abnor-
mal change in the number of visual artists (Abbing, 2002). First, in 1949,
the well-known Beeldend Kunstenaars Regeling (Visual Artists Scheme) was
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established under which professional visual artists, who earned less than a
certain minimum income, were allowed to sell art to local authorities in
order to supplement their income. If their work met certain, rather low,
quality criteria, local authorities were obliged to buy the artworks offered
to them. Between 1949 and 1983, increasingly large numbers of artists used
the scheme and, more significantly, in this period the yearly increase in the
number of students in art colleges increased much faster than in other
arts training and in other post-18 vocational training establishments. The
gradual abolition between 1983 and 1987 of the scheme, which had become
too expensive, represents a second example. The yearly increase in the
number of visual art students dropped below average levels. And in the next
ten years many more artists who had earlier participated in the scheme left
the arts than could have been expected otherwise.
Recently in the Netherlands a new scheme, the Wet Inkomensvoorziening
Kunstenaars (Law for the Income Provision of Artists) has been established
that can be used by all low-income artists who would otherwise need social
benefits. Artists who are in a bad financial situation and receive or could
receive social benefits can for a number of years receive the special WIK
benefits while still being able to earn some money in the arts and without
an obligation to apply for other jobs. Given the data from the first year of
operation, 1999, the scheme turns out to be attractive to far more artists
than had been the intention. Artists use it as a replacement not only for ben-
efits but also for second jobs in order to work more hours in the arts.
Therefore this scheme as well is bound to boost the numbers of artists.
Misleading information leads to uncompensated poverty
Governments evidently believe that financial poverty among artists is a bad
thing that must be mended. And artists naturally welcome and often
demand government support. But are artists really badly off? To answer
this, a distinction is made here between compensated and uncompensated
poverty. If well-informed artists exchange money for other rewards, such as
private satisfaction, recognition and status, financial poverty is compen-
sated. Taking into account other forms of income, there is no overall
penalty. If, however, artists and artists-to-be are less well informed than
other professionals about their chances of gaining non-monetary rewards,
the income penalty is not compensated or is only partly compensated, and
poverty is real.
Because of the strong mythology of the arts, we argue that poverty is not
altogether compensated. Through misinformation, part of poverty must be
real, but it is hard to tell how large this part is. In this context it is telling
that economists increasingly speak of an oversupply of art and artists
(Menger, 1999; Towse, 2001). If poverty were fully compensated, the term
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‘oversupply’ would be strange, if not unjustified, irrespective of the large
number of artists and the large quantities of art that are being produced.
Nevertheless, there are small, but growing, areas in the arts in which
poverty may well be fully compensated. For instance, there is a growing
group of artists who hold attractive multiple jobs. Their arts-related and
non-arts jobs are pleasant and well paid. Even if they could afford to do art
full-time, they would not do it.9 Evidently, their inclination to exchange
monetary for non-monetary rewards is lower than in the case of the average
artist. Moreover, they are probably relatively well informed.
In the case of multiple jobholders, the line between amateur artists and
professional artists is not always clear. This takes me to a final remark that
puts poverty in the arts in another perspective again. In economics, produc-
ers earn money, while consumers spend money. Applying this distinction to
the arts, all artists who cannot make a living from making art and therefore
spend money on their activities in the arts must be counted as consumers,
who spend money on their ‘hobby’, and not as producers. A huge army of
artists would therefore have to be removed from the professional arts and
suddenly income figures would rise considerably. Former poor and ‘miser-
able’ artists would turn into ‘happy’ amateurs. If they also earn a little bit
with their hobby, this is like a present: poverty is non-existent. However, the
financial problems of the arts cannot be solved that easily. The difference
between professionals and amateurs is not a matter of a textbook defini-
tion. The distinction is socially constructed. It depends on a large number
of variables that slowly change over time, and at present economic variables
like income are relatively unimportant in the arts. Therefore the above
accounting trick does not work.
Summary
Modern governments care about the financial well-being of their artists. In
the modern welfare state, no group must be left behind, least of all artists,
the producers of ‘sacred’ art. Nevertheless, as argued here, subsidies are
basically counter-productive; they increase poverty, because numbers of
artists become larger and therefore more artists are poor. The only way to
reduce poverty is to discourage youngsters from going into the arts, both
by giving information which contradicts the mythology of the arts and by
reducing subsidies. For the time being, governments in the mainland
European countries are not likely to adopt either strategy. Governments
have an interest in the mythology of the arts and they have an interest in
being involved in the arts.
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Notes
1. As the economy of the arts is relatively exceptional, other professional groups, like aca-
demics, exhibit similar exceptional behaviour, but most of the time to a lesser degree.
2. See Wassall and Alper (1992), who review several studies. In older reports, like that of
Frey and Pommerehne (1989) the income penalty found is less high. However, in those
reports many poor artists were not counted because of inadequate enumeration tech-
niques and artists were compared with average workers instead of professionals.
Moreover, real hourly incomes in the arts have gone down during the last decades, as
Throsby (1996) shows for Australia. According to Menger (1999), incomes have also gone
down in Europe, while Alper et al. (1996) state that currently US poverty rates among
artists are higher than for any other group in professional or technical occupations.
3. Wassall and Alper (1992), Throsby (1996, pp.232–4) and Menger (1999, p.602).
4. This is in line with the conclusion of Throsby (1994), who states that subsidies increase
output rather than income.
5. Among others, Frey and Pommerehne (1989), Montias (1987), Hoogenboom (1993) and
Stolwijk (1998) offer plausible evidence that incomes in the arts were not that low before
the twentieth century.
6. Even when the percentage of poor artists among artists remains the same, the absolute
number of poor artists increases.
7. Abbing (2002) analyses different types of subsidies in more detail, also from the perspec-
tive of ‘signalling’. Certain schemes give stronger signals to artists than others do. For
instance, they may signal that ‘government will always be there to help the artist out’.
8. The absence of a consistent definition of artists within and between countries makes this
type of comparison impossible (Ernst, 1999).
9. According to Menger (1999), these artists diversify risks through their occupational
choices.
See also:
Chapter 5: Art prices; Chapter 7: Artists’ labour markets; Chapter 60: Visual arts.
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